Conclusion in Part 2
In Part 2, we concluded the following:
“BioNTech has no skills or experience in the development and manufacture of complex, biologic products, let alone gene therapy products. It should never have received a licence to manufacture SARS-CoV-2 injections.”
That should have been a red flag to regulators and governments around the world, but it wasn’t. The alleged pandemic, apparently, was more important.
That followed on from Part 1, where we learnt that BioNTech is a ‘virtual company’.
A virtual company is one that owns little other than its intellectual property rights (IPR = patents), and business acumen. All the extensive physical activities required to bring a drug to preclinical and clinical trials, plus for commercial sale, are outsourced to third party organisations.
We also discovered in Part 1 that a manufacturer of their drug substance (DP, or Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient - API) had received a scathing inspection report from FDA:
“Rentschler Biopharma, a German CDMO, was cited by the FDA with a Form 483 following an inspection that revealed nine observations focused on procedural gaps and records keeping.” This is the Form 483.
That’s enough to close a site down for months or even years, but they have been allowed to carry on. It should be glaring obvious, however, that BioNTech has no ability to carry out the oversight to correct these critical issues.